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ABSTRACT:  
The ‘Easterlin Paradox’ holds that economic growth in nations does not buy greater 
happiness for the average citizen. This thesis was advanced in the 1970s on the basis of the 
then available data on happiness in nations. Later, data have disproved most of the 
empirical claims behind the thesis, but Easterlin still maintains that there is no long-term 
correlation between economic growth and happiness. This last claim was tested using the 
time trend data available in the World Database of Happiness, which involve 1,531 data 
points in 67 nations that yield 199 time-series ranging from 10 to more than 40 years. The 
analysis reveals a positive correlation between GDP growth and rise of in happiness in 
nations. Both GDP and happiness have gone up in most nations, and average happiness 
has risen more in nations where the economy has grown the most; r = +0.20 p < 05. On 
average a 1% growth in income per capita per year was followed by a rise in average 
happiness on scale 0-10 of 0.0034; thus, a gain in happiness of a full point would take 60 
years with an annual economic growth of 5%. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The economy has grown over the last decades in most contemporary nations and economic 
growth is likely to continue in the future. Though generally welcomed, there are also 
reservations about this ongoing economic growth. Over the ages, there have been warnings 
against the lures of material wealth and since the 1960s there has also been growing 
concern about sustainability issues. In this context, the question arises as to what 
increasing wealth does to human wellbeing and that question has become a subject of 
empirical research. 
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1.1 The Easterlin Paradox 
In 1974, Easterlin (1974) published the seminal paper ‘Does economic growth improve the 
human lot?’ His answer was no. This conclusion was based on the then available survey 
data on happiness. Comparing within nations he saw that rich individuals are typically 
happier than their poor compatriots. Yet, comparing across nations, Easterlin noted that 
average happiness was not higher in rich nations than in poor nations and comparing over 
time he observed no rise in average happiness in the USA between 1944 and 1970, in spite 
of impressive economic growth in that period. 
This finding came to be known as the ‘Easterlin Paradox’ and is commonly seen as the 
start of ‘happiness economics’. It prompted a stream of scientific publications.1 A search in 
Google Scholar on ‘Easterlin Paradox’ yields more than 4,500 hits. Most of these 
publications are about explanations for the phenomenon, but a considerable body of 
literature is on whether it really exists. 
Over the years, this has resulted in a watering down of the thesis. As we will see in 
more detail in Section 1.3, Easterlin (1995) first dropped the claim that there is no same-
time correlation between economic development and average happiness in nations, but 
maintained that there is no over-time correlation. Current textbooks typically mention that 
second version and illustrate with the case of the USA, where income rose but happiness 
not. Recently, Easterlin admitted that economic growth tends to boost happiness in the 
short run, but still maintains that there is no long-term effect of economic growth on 
happiness in nations (10 years and more). He also added that in the long run higher rates of 
economic growth do result in proportionally greater happiness (Easterlin and Angelescu, 
2009; Easterlin et al., 2010). 
 
1.2 Explanations for the paradox 
In his 1974 paper, Easterlin explained the non-relation between the wealth of nations and 
average happiness of its citizens in terms of interpersonal comparison, in line with the 
sociological theory of ‘relative deprivation’, which Stouffer (1949) uses to explain 
dissatisfaction with rank among American soldiers. In the same vein, Easterlin assumes 
that satisfaction with life depends on interpersonal comparison and since reference persons 
are typically compatriots, the distance to these is about the same in rich and poor countries. 
Easterlin also mentions the role of rising aspiration and in this context refers to the notion 
of a ‘hedonic treadmill’, a term coined by Brickman and Campbell (1971) in this days.2 
Though these explanations seem plausible, it has appeared difficult to prove that they 
really apply. Over time, the explanations have also lost plausibility. One reason is in 
comparison theory itself, because the related thesis of shifting standards (e.g., VanPraag 
and Kaptein, 1973) predicts that satisfaction will tend to the neutral level and do so both 
among the poor and the rich. This is clearly not the case: average happiness is above 
neutral, at least in developed nations, and the rich remain happier than the poor. At a more 
basic level, Veenhoven (1991, 2009a) has cast doubt on the theory that happiness is a 
matter of comparison. In his view not all satisfaction is equally dependent on social 
comparison and satisfaction with domains, such as rank and income, more so than 
satisfaction with life as a whole. He argues that life satisfaction depends on affective 
experience rather than on cognitive comparison, and that affective experience depends on 
meeting innate ‘needs’ rather than learned ‘wants’. 
The paradox has also been explained by the negative effects of economic growth. One 
line of argumentation is that economic growth involves high costs, such as the work it 
involves and the stresses of competition (e.g., Schorr, 1993, 1999). Another negative effect 
is seen in the effects of economic prosperity on life style, such as increased consumption 
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of high caloric food and too much television viewing. In this line, Scitovsky (1976) makes 
the case that mass-consumption does not really satisfy and Lane (2000) argues that the 
attendant culture of materialism tends to blind people to more solid sources of happiness. 
 
1.3 Tests of the reality of the paradox 
Rather than seeking for explanations, some scholars have inspected the evidence for the 
empirical claim. Ever more data on happiness in nations has become available over the 
years and this has gradually changed the picture. 
 
1.3.1 Comparison across nations 
The first piece of evidence presented by Easterlin is that average happiness does not differ 
between rich and poor nations. This claim is based on analyses of average happiness in a 
dozen countries against the log of income per head. Yet, consideration of absolute income, 
rather than log-income radically changes the picture and yields a correlation of +0.59 
(Veenhoven, 1989). Later studies in this line using an ever greater number of nations have 
also shown strong correlations and a recent study among 123 nations even found a strong 
correlation between average happiness and log-income 
across nations (Deaton, 2008) of an equal magnitude as the within country correlation 
between individual income and happiness (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008, 2013). 
 
1.3.2 Comparison over time 
Easterlin also used time series data on happiness and income per head to show that 
economic growth in the USA was not followed by a rise in average happiness. In later 
publications, he presents longer time series on the USA, which also show a pattern of 
stagnant happiness in spite of rising wealth (Easterlin, 1995). 
One line of criticism does not doubt these facts, but questions the interpretation. A 
positive effect of economic growth on happiness may have been suppressed by other 
developments. In this line, Fisher (2008) has argued that in the USA happiness has 
stagnated because of a demonstrable deterioration in family life, which is unrelated to 
economic development. Likewise, Phelps (2011) explains the stagnation of happiness as a 
response to a decline in the percentage of altruists in the population. In a similar vein, 
Veenhoven (2007) suggests that the pains of cultural change have delayed a rise in 
happiness in Japan and South Korea. 
Another approach is to check the empirical claim made by Easterlin as such: Is there 
really no correlation between economic growth and happiness in nations? One question in 
this context is whether average happiness in nations tends to remain at the same level, as 
Easterlin observed in the USA, or if rising happiness is more common. Another question is 
whether rising happiness goes together with economic growth. 
 
Evidence of rising happiness in nations 
Using time series data from 21 nations, Hagerty and Veenhoven (2003) note that stagnant 
happiness is the exception rather than the rule, since average happiness has gone up in 
most nations of the world, even in the USA, since the 1970s. In reply, Easterlin (2005) 
argues that the evidence for rising happiness is still ‘fragmentary’. Yet, evidence of rising 
happiness is mounting. In an analysis of the World Values Surveys, Inglehart et al. (2008) 
found a pattern of rising happiness in most participating nations since the 1980s and 
happiness has also increased in most of the nations where the Eurobarometer started in the 
early 1970s (Vergunst, 2011; Veenhoven, 2012c). 
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Evidence of link with economic growth 
The last question is whether this rise in happiness is due to economic growth. Hagerty and 
Veenhoven (2003) argue that rising happiness typically coincides with economic growth. 
Yet, Easterlin replies that there is still no correlation between the rate of growth in GDP 
and happiness, at least when the analysis limits to cases of significant change (Easterlin 
and Angelescu, 2009). Recently, he has presented more data to support this view, based on 
an analysis of 54 countries (Easterlin et al., 2010). 
In another recent paper (Easterlin and Angelesco, 2009), Easterlin states that there are 
countries where economic growth and average happiness go hand in hand, but claims that 
this is a short-term effect. On that basis, he maintains that economic growth does not add 
to happiness in the long run. 
Research findings on this matter are mixed so far. In an analysis of 15 European nations 
over the years 1973 to 2002, Bjornskov et al. (2008) found no relation of happiness with 
economic growth as such, but observed growing happiness in response to accelerations of 
economic growth. Graham (2011) reports a negative effect of growth rate in the last 5 
years, which she calls the ‘paradox of unhappy growth’. Yet, several studies have shown 
positive correlations between happiness and economic growth (e.g., Di Tella et al., 2003; 
Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008). All these studies consider a limited number of nations. 
The best available data of the moment are reported by Diener et al. (2012), who use 
five yearly waves of the Gallup World Poll over the years 2007 to 2011 in 158 nations. 
Contrary to Easterlin’s thesis they found a positive effect of economic growth on 
happiness. One particular strong point of this study is that it considers both change in GDP 
per capita and change in household consumption. Another strong point is that they 
measured both cognitive contentment and affective experience. Remarkably, this study did 
not provide evidence of a reference shift. A weak point of the study is that it covers only 5 
years, so Easterlin can still maintain that economic growth does not add to happiness in the 
long run. 
In this context, the present study was focused on the long-term effects of economic 
growth on average happiness in nations and used time-series of at least ten years.  
1.4 Aims of this study 
This paper is about that last surviving empirical claims of the Easterlin Paradox, that is, 
version 3 as mentioned in Section 1.1. We consider whether economic growth in nations 
tends to go together with rising average happiness in the long run, and if so, whether more 
growths yields proportionally greater happiness. In line with Easterlin, we conceive ‘long 
run’ as periods of 10 years or more. We use the latest available data on the largest 
available number of nations to answer the following research questions: 
1 Did average happiness in nations remain at the same level over the last decade? a Is the 
number of cases of rise in happiness about the same as the number of 
decline in happiness? b If happiness risen, does this tendency manifest both in the short   
and the long run? 
 
2 If happiness has risen, is its rise typically paralleled by economic growth? 
  
      a  Has happiness risen more often in countries where the economy has grown than in       
countries where the economy has stagnated?  
      b Has average happiness raised more in nations where the economy has grown the 
most? 
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3 If rising happiness has tended to go together with economic growth, is this correlation 
similar across situations, or: 
      a Has the correlation existed only in the short-term and not in the long-term?  
   b Does the correlation exist only in poor nations, or also in rich nations?  
   c Is the correlation stronger in nations where economic growth is constant than in nations 
where economic growth has been erratic? 
 
4 Do the correlations between happiness and economic growth differ across measures of 
happiness used? 
 
Note the difference between questions 2a and 2b. Economic growth may add to happiness 
irrespective of its size; some growth may have a similar effect on happiness as much 
growth has. Tests of the Easterlin Paradox deal typically with question 2b, neglecting 
question 2a. Question 3 deals with contingencies. The Easterlin Paradox may apply to 
specific conditions and may not apply in other contexts. From a policy point of view it is 
important to know where it applies and where not. Question 4 is a test of robustness. 
 
 
2 DATA 
 
The data used in this study were obtained from the following sources. 
 
2.1 Data on change of average happiness in nations 
The data on average happiness in nations were taken from the World Database of 
Happiness (Veenhoven, 2012e). This is a ‘findings archive’ on happiness in the sense of 
subjective enjoyment of one’s life as a whole. 
 
2.1.1 World database of happiness 
The archive contains research findings yielded with measures that fit this concept of 
happiness as life-satisfaction. All acceptable indicators are included in the collection 
‘measures of happiness’ (Veenhoven, 2012b). 
Most measures are single survey questions, such as the famous item ‘taking all 
together, how happy would you say you are these days, are you very happy, pretty happy 
or not too happy?’ This is just one of many acceptable measures of happiness. Survey 
questions have used different key words, such as ‘satisfaction with life’, and different 
response options, such as numerical scales. Next to these single questions there are also 
multiple questions, some of which constitute a ‘balance scale’. 
This diversity of measures of happiness used in the many surveys makes it difficult to 
compare scores and in particular to assess change in average happiness over time. The 
different measures of happiness are therefore sorted into ‘equivalent’ kinds, that is, 
questions that address happiness using the same keyword and a rating scale of the same 
length. 
Research findings yielded using these acceptable measures of happiness are described 
in standard excerpts using standard terminology. Two kinds of findings are distinguished, 
‘distributional findings’ and ‘correlational findings’. Distributional findings denote how 
happy people are in a particular population and are often summarised in a measure of 
central tendency, typically the mean. Correlational findings are about things that go 
together with more or less happiness and summarised using measures of association, such 
as Pearson’s correlation coefficient. 
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Distributional findings are sorted into findings among special publics, such as elderly 
persons, and findings in the general population. The findings on happiness in the general 
public are further subdivided by the kind of areas from which samples were drawn, such as 
‘regions’, ‘cities’ and ‘nations’. These latter findings are gathered in the collection of 
‘happiness in nations’ (Veenhoven, 2012c), which we used for this research. 
 
2.1.2 Collection happiness in nations 
To date (November 2012) the collection ‘happiness in nations’ contains 5204 findings on 
average happiness of the general population3 in 164 nations over the years 1946 to 2011. 
These findings are sorted in three levels, one by nation, two within nations by kind of 
measure used and three within measures of the same kind by year. 
An example of a ‘nation page’ is presented on Appendix A. This is the case of 
Argentina for which 35 distributional findings in the general public are available. These 
findings are sorted in blocks of equivalent survey questions. The first block consists of 
seven findings yielded by a survey question on how ‘happy’ one is, the answers to which 
were rated on a four step verbal response scale. The measure codes link to the precise text 
of that question and detailed information about the investigation can be found behind the 
‘i’ icon. 
Findings are sorted by year within each block, and this first block consists of the years 
1981, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2005 and 2008. Looking at the blocks in Appendix A, we 
see no clear trend in the responses to the question on happiness (measure type 111C) 
between 1981 and 2008, but a gradual change to the better in the responses to questions 
about life-satisfaction (measure type 121C and 122F) and the Cantril ladder (measure type 
31D). 
 
2.1.3 Identical questions 
Within these blocks of equivalent questions there are still small differences in the wording 
of the lead question and/or response options. These variations are marked by the last 
symbol in the measure code. There are also variations in the timeframe addressed in the 
question, and these are marked with the third letter code, where ‘c’ stand for ‘current’, ‘g’ 
for in ‘general’ and ‘u’ is used for ‘unclear’. These minor variations in the wording of 
questions can result in small differences in the mean scores and could as such overshadow 
the small changes in actual happiness over time. For that reason we limited our data set to 
time-series based on identical questions, that is, questions with the same measure code.4 
In the above mentioned case of seven questions on how ‘happy’ one is in Argentina 
this meant that we considered only the five findings based on the question variant ‘a’. 
Since the series of answers to question variant ‘f covered only 6 years, these were left out. 
 
2.1.4 Transformation to common 0-10 numerical scale 
We decided to use the transformed means, provided in the World Database of Happiness, 
for reasons of comparability. These transformed means are expressed on a common 
numerical scale ranging from 0 (low) to 10 (high). Scores on numerical response scales, 
shorter than this, are linearly stretched to give a range of 0-10. Scores on scales with verbal 
response options are transformed using a procedure first described by Thurstone (1927), in 
which experts rate the numerical value of response options. This procedure is described in 
more detail in Veenhoven (1993), chapter 7 ‘How the data are homogenised’. 
 
2.1.5 Series 
On this basis, we constructed several series of responses to identical questions on 
happiness in the same nation over time. Since we focus on the long-term, we limited our 
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analysis to series that covered a minimum of 10 years. We also limited the analysis to data 
gathered using probability samples. If the same question had been used in several surveys 
in the same year in the same country, we used the average response to that question. We 
did not require that a series involved more than two data points, though most series involve 
more. 
This resulted in 199 time-series for average happiness in 67 nations, which together 
gave 1,531 data points. The data matrix is presented in Appendix B. This database is about 
twice the size of the one used in the latest test of this aspect of the Easterlin Paradox by 
Stevenson and Wolfers (2008). 
 
2.2 Data on economic growth in nations 
Data on the economic performance of nations were taken from the World Bank (2012) 
online database. We considered both the income per capita in the year before each data 
point on happiness and the growth of that nation’s economy in the same year as a 
percentage of the GDP. Additional data for Taiwan were found in the library of the IMF 
(2012). 
Income per capita for each of the years in each of the countries was expressed in US 
dollars. Economic growth in nations was measured using the yearly growth of the GDP as 
a percentage measured in local currency. 
These data did not cover all the periods for which we had data on happiness. One 
reason is that the World Bank does not provide data for the years before 1960. Another 
reason is that some nations have only emerged recently, for example, Croatia, a nation 
which was born from the death of former ‘Great’ Yugoslavia in 1991. 
 
 
3 METHODS 
 
The following methods were used to find answers to the questions set out in Section 1.4. 
 
3.1 Assessing change of average happiness over time 
Question 1 dealt with whether average happiness has typically remained at the same level, 
or has risen in most nations. We answered that question in two ways. We first assessed 
change in each of the 199 series of responses to the same question on happiness in the 
same country. Next, we computed the average change over all series in the same country. 
 
3.1.1 Change of average happiness in series of identical questions 
We regressed happiness against year in all the 199 time series. The resulting regression 
coefficients were used to indicate the yearly change in happiness in the period covered by 
the series. Since happiness is expressed on range 0-10, a regression coefficient of 0.01 
means a rise of 0.1 point per year, which amounts to a 1 point gain in happiness over 10 
years. These yearly coefficients were used in the following ways. 
 
Ratio of rise or decline 
We first counted the number of series in which happiness had gone up and the number in 
which happiness had gone down. On that basis, we assessed the ratio; a ratio greater than 
1 indicates that increasing happiness is more common than decline; a ratio of 1 that rising 
and declining happiness are equally frequent, and a ratio smaller than one that a decline in 
happiness is the most common. The Easterlin Paradox holds that happiness tends to remain 
at the same level, around which is at best some random fluctuation and this predicts a ratio 
of about 1.5 
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Average change coefficient 
The above bi-partitions provide a view on the relative frequency of rise and decline in 
happiness, but do so at the cost of loss of variation. In order to use the available variance 
more fully we computed the average change over all 199 series and assessed whether that 
average coefficient was positive or negative. 
 
3.1.2 Change of average happiness in countries 
Using the change coefficients in the series, we computed the average change coefficients 
for each of the 67 nations. Where only one series was available, we took the change 
coefficient observed in that one and when more series were available we computed the 
average change score. 
These change scores in nations were analysed in the same way as the change scores in 
the series. First, a ratio of rise or decline in happiness was obtained and then the average 
change scores were computed and we assessed the statistical significance of these scores. 
 
3.2 Assessing economic growth 
We assessed the average yearly growth of GDP per capita for each of the countries, for 
each of the periods for which a series on average happiness was available. These change 
coefficients ranged from -0.034 in Belarus 1990 to 2000 to +0.120 in China 2000 to 2009. 
With three exceptions the coefficients were positive. 
 
3.3 Assessing correspondence between growth of GDP and happiness 
Different questions are at stake here: research question 2a deals with whether economic 
growth tends to go with any change in happiness. Next, question 2b deals with whether 
more economic growth is followed by a greater rise in happiness. Question 3 deals with 
the possible variations on these general patterns of correlation. 
 
3.3.1 Is there any correlation? 
Question 2a serves as a first test of Easterlin’s claim that economic growth does not buy 
greater happiness. To check this hypothesis we counted the number of cases in which this 
thesis applied and compared it with the number of cases in which it did not. 
To that end we first ordered the possible combinations of growth and decline, see the 2 
x 2 table presented in Table 1. The ‘paradoxical’ cases are called ‘discordant’ and coloured 
red. The cases that fit common sense are called ‘concordant’ and coloured green. We next 
counted the number of cases in each category and assessed the odds ratio. If Easterlin is 
right, that ratio must be about 1. 
 
3.3.2 More cases of rising happiness in strong growing economies? 
Question 2b deals with whether happiness has raised more in countries where the economy 
has grown the most. One answer to this question is whether rising happiness is more 
common in the fastest growing economies. A related, but not identical, question is whether 
the rise of happiness is proportionally greater in the fast growing economies. 
 
Odds of rise or decline of happiness in slow and fast economic growth  
We distinguished between cases of modest economic growth and strong economic growth, 
using the median of the growth percentages found. 
 
Correlation between change scores of happiness and GDP 
Next, we assessed the correlation between the rates of yearly change in GDP and 
happiness. We did this for all of the 199 time series for happiness and then computed the 
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average correlation over all the time series. We then considered the average change 
coefficients per nation and regressed the average change in happiness against the growth of 
GDP in that nation in the same period, again with a one-year interval. 
 
Estimates of effect size 
In a first analysis, we considered the average effect of a 1% change in GDP on happiness 
on a range 0-10. Then we computed the average effect of a $100 rise in GDP per capita on 
happiness. 
 
3.3.3 Correspondence contingent to situations? 
Question 3 deals with possible variations on this general pattern. Question 3a covers 
whether the effect of economic growth on happiness is short lived or rather manifests in 
the long-term. Question 3b deals with whether the effect differs across poor and rich 
nations and question 3 c with whether smooth economic growth works out better on 
average happiness than bumpy growth. 
 
Short and long-term 
To answer question 3, we repeated the above mentioned analyses for each of the three time 
intervals considered, the short-term of 10 to 20 years, the medium term of 21 to 40 years 
and the long-term of more than 40 years. 
Poor and rich nations 
To answer question 3b, we measured economic prosperity of nations using the GDP per 
capita in US$. The data used for this analysis were again taken from the website of the 
World Bank (2012). We followed the distinction made by the World Bank between: ‘low’ 
income’ ‘lower-middle’ income, ‘upper-middle’ income and ‘high income nations. Our 
data set did not include any ‘low-income’ countries, as rated by the World Bank. 
 
Smooth versus bumpy growth 
To answer question 3c, we estimated instability (i) in economic growth by taking the 
variance in yearly GDP per capita that cannot be explained by the linear trend over the 
years. To that end we first regressed GDP on year, with GDP dependent and year 
independent. In the case of perfect stability, all GDP scores should be on the trend line, 
and the regression coefficient 1. We computed the deviation from that pattern, using the 
following formula: i = 1 - R2. 
 
3.3.4 Robust across measures of happiness? 
Finally, we checked whether these patterns differed across the measures of happiness used 
in these time series. 
 
3.4 Significance 
So far how we assessed average change in happiness and GNP per capita and the 
correlation between these changes. A next question was whether the observed coefficients 
are worth considering or not. 
One way to answer that question is to consider the effect size and pick a minimum, such as 
over a 10 year period, a 0.1 point change in happiness and a correlation 
coefficient with economic growth of at least +0.20. In that case, our conclusion limits to 
the series studied here. 
Another way is to generalise beyond the observations and in that context it is common 
practice to infer the probability that the correlation observed in the sample is positive, 
while there is actually no correlation in the population from which this sample is drawn. In 
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that context, a 95% probability is usually deemed ‘significant’. This is how Easterlin 
treated the time series. 
Though routinely performed, this test for significance involves making strong 
assumptions that do not fully apply in this case. One such assumption is that the 199 series 
provide a random sample of all possible time series in the 67 nations. Another dubious 
assumption is that the 67 nations provide a random sample of all nations in the world. Still 
another thing to be kept in mind is that significance depends very much on the sample size, 
small effects are significant in big samples, and big effects insignificant in small samples. 
Significance depends also on the dispersion in the observations and on choices made by 
the investigator, with respect to the null-hypothesis, one-sided or two-sided testing, and the 
probability level. All this makes tests for significance precarious. 
In our view, the descriptive approach is the most informative in this case. The number 
of series at hand is large and covers all we can ever have over this period. The 
interpretation is straight forward, we can easily see in Appendix B where the Easterlin 
Paradox has applied (coefficient 0) and where not (all the positive coefficients). 
Still, we realise that many readers are accustomed to significance testing and some are 
willing to buy the above mentioned perils, even when acknowledged. We therefore did 
some significance tests. We tested whether the observed positive change in happiness is 
more common than negative change and whether concordance with economic growth is 
more common than discordance. 
In these analyses, we used all available coefficients, even those based on a limited 
number of data-points. A reviewer argued that we should consider only significant 
coefficients. We disagree. The number of data-points in most of the separate series is too 
small for a meaningful significance test and restricting to the sufficiently dense series 
would lead into the selectiveness that has played Easterlin false. We also avoid his fault of 
taking non-significance in too small series for evidence of non-correlation.6 
 
 
4 RESULTS 
 
Our findings contradict Easterlin’s predictions: average happiness has increased in most 
nations and increased more in the nations where the economy had grown. This pattern was 
found over long time spans and appeared both among poor and rich nations. 
 
4.1 Happiness rose in most nations 
Question 1 dealt with whether average happiness in nations tends to remain at the same 
level over the years (as Easterlin holds), or that average happiness tends to rise (as Hagerty 
and Veenhoven hold). 
 
4.1.1 More advance than decline 
Of the 199 series 67% showed a rise in happiness and 33% a decline, which resulted in a 
ratio of 2.0. Likewise happiness rose in 62% of the 66 nations and declined in 38%, which 
is a ratio of 1.6. See Table 2(a). This is clearly more than the ratio of about 1 that Easterlin 
predicts. 
The average yearly rise in happiness observed in the 199 series is +0.016. The average 
rise in the 67 nations was +0.012. 
These numbers may seem small at first sight, but result in a considerable improvement 
in happiness in the long term. At this growth rate average happiness will rise one point on 
a 0-10 scale in 70 years. Given that the actual range on this scale is between 2.5 and 8.5 
(Veenhoven, 2012d), a one point rise equals a gain of 17%. 
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4.1.2 In the long run 
In his latest paper Easterlin argues that happiness rises in the short run only. Our data show 
otherwise. Remember that we considered time-series of at least 10 years, so we deal with 
long-term change in Easterlin’s use of that term. We can see from Table 2(b) that the 
average change in happiness does not differ very much between the long and very long-
term and that the rise is slightly stronger in the longest term considered, that is, 40 years of 
more. 
 
4.2 Rise of happiness paralleled by economic growth 
Now that we have established that average happiness has risen in most nations, the next 
questions are about the relationship of this rise with economic growth. Question 2a deals 
with whether there any parallel at all between increase of average happiness and GDP. If 
so, question 2b is whether there is proportionality in the relationship: Has happiness 
increased more in the nations were the economy has grown the most? Lastly, question 3 is 
whether we are dealing with a general pattern or whether the correlation between rising 
happiness and growth of the economy is contingent on specific situations. 
 
4.2.1 More concordant than discordant combinations 
Question 2a covers whether economic growth tends to be accompanied by rising 
happiness. According to Easterlin, this is typically not the case and the term ‘paradox’ is 
also used to denote this difference between common sense expectation and reality. 
What is the most common pattern in the period observed here? Following the method 
presented in Section 3.1.1, we counted the number of cases in which economic growth was 
paralleled by rising happiness (concordant with common sense) and the number of cases in 
which it was not7 (discordant) and next assessed the ratio of these. See Table 3(a). As one 
can see, there are hardly any cases of long-term economic decline. Most of the variation is 
in changes of average happiness. In this table, the number of concordant cases is 132 and 
the number of discordant cases 64, which equals a ratio of 2.2. So ‘paradoxical’ 
combinations are clearly not the rule. 
 
4.2.2 Greater rise of happiness in nations where the economy grew most 
Question 2b, in extension to question 2a, deals with proportionality in the relationship 
between increase of happiness and economic growth: has more economic growth come 
together with a greater rise in happiness? This correlation was assessed in two ways. 
 
More rise of happiness in fastest growing countries 
We distinguished between slow and fast growing economies, using the median of 
economic growth in our dataset. We next counted the cases of rising and declining 
happiness in each of these categories, see Table 3(b). Again, we compared the number of 
cases that fit the common sense expectation that more growth goes with more happiness to 
the discordant situation. Once more the former outweighed the latter. The odds ratio was 
2.14 and statistically significant. 
 
Significant correlation 
Considering the correlation between average economic growth in the past year and average 
change of happiness we observed a correlation of +0.20. This correlation is significantly 
different from zero at the 95% confidence level. A split-up of the data by length of the 
time period considered showed similar correlations. See Table 3(c). Two of these three 
similar correlations are statistically significant, but the third is not. Since the effect size is 
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the same, this non-significance is due to the limited number of 18 observations. One-sided 
tests yielded the same result. 
The pattern of correlation is presented visually in the scatter plots shown in Figures 
1(a), 1(b) and 1(c). In each of these figures one can see a modest correlation. There is no 
clear pattern of non-linearity. So the Easterlin Paradox fails this test. 
 
Size of the effect 
The average effect of 1% economic growth on happiness in the next year is a gain of about 
0.00335 points on a scale of 0-10. Whether this effect is strong of small will be discussed 
in section 5.2. 
 
4.3  Variation across situations 
Question 3 deals with possible contingencies. Are we dealing with a general pattern or 
does economic growth add to happiness only in specific conditions? 
 
Little difference across time-span 
The available data show a positive correlation between economic growth and happiness 
over all three long-term time spans considered here. The correlation of the yearly change 
rates is lowest over the shortest time span of 10-20 year periods: 0.003 compared to 0.006 
over the 10-40 years periods and 0.005 in the series of 40 or more years. See Table 4(a). 
 
Stronger in poor nations 
In line with expectation, we found that the correlation between happiness and economic 
growth is strongest in the poor nations. The correlation is quite strong in the 20 ‘lower 
middle’ income nations in this data set and relatively small in the nations where the 
income per capita is at the upper middle level and the high level [see Table 4(b)]. 
 
No less in bumpy growth 
We expected that the effect of economic growth on happiness would be smaller in nations 
that have gone though economic ups and downs than in nations where the economy has 
grown more smoothly. This expectation was not supported by the data [see Table 4(c)]. 
 
4.4 Similar across measures of happiness 
Finally, we checked whether the correlations between happiness and economic growth 
differ across the measures of happiness used. To that end, we limited our examination to 
cases for which at least 15 time-series were available, since the variation in the nations 
involved might otherwise cloud the effect of the measures. There were four such cases in 
the data set, all of which yielded yearly change correlations in the range of +0.0025 to 
+0.034. Results not shown. 
 
 
5  DISCUSSION 
 
Our aim with this study was to check the claim that average happiness in nations tends to 
remain at the same level in spite of economic growth. Our data do not support that claim; 
we found that happiness tends to rise over time and to rise more in nations where the 
economy has grown the most. This begs the question of why our findings differ from 
Easterlin’s. The next question we must ask is about the observed effect size: Is this small 
or substantial? We conclude that the long-term effect of economic growth on happiness is 
substantial and this opens a new agenda for research. 
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5.1  Why are our results different from Easterlin’s latest reading of the data? 
Easterlin et al.’s (2010) latest analysis is based on data for 37 nations over time spans 
varying from 12 to 34 years. The number of data points used is not reported. The analysis 
reported in this paper draws on data from 67 nations and over periods running from a 
 minimum of 10 years to 46 years, which gave us 1,531 data points. This difference in size 
of the available data pool is crucial. The law of greater numbers helped us to see a general 
pattern, which Easterlin could not see. 
Additionally, Easterlin uses responses to a question on financial satisfaction as the 
dependent variable in his separate analysis of 17 Latin American nations. Yet, financial 
satisfaction is not the same as life-satisfaction and is more likely to adjust to changed 
income levels as has been shown by VanPraag and Kaptein (1973). We consistently used 
the available data on happiness in the sense of life-satisfaction and in this respect our data 
are better suited to the question to hand. 
 
5.2 Is the effect of economic growth on happiness big or small? 
As we have seen, 1 % economic growth was followed by a rise in average happiness in the 
next year of 0.0034. This yearly gain in average happiness may appear small at first sight 
and could as such be taken as a proof of the thesis that economic growth does not buy 
greater happiness. Yet, economic growth is typically higher than 1% a year and small 
effects amount to a considerable increase in the long-term. An annual 5% growth of the 
economy will lead to a gain of a full point in average happiness on a scale 0-10 in 60 
years, which equals 10% of the theoretical variation on a scale of 0-10 and 17% of the 
actual variation between 2.5 and 8.5. 
When expressed in effect of a $100 increase in GDP per capita the average effect of 
economic growth on happiness is about 0.10 in poor countries and 0.003 in rich countries 
[Table 4(b)] This means that in poor nations a gain of one point of happiness on scale 0-10 
will require a $1,000 increase and in rich countries an increase of about $ 33,000. 
The above figures are probably an underestimation of the real effects of economic 
growth on happiness. One reason is that the law of big numbers may not have neutralised 
all the random measurement error in both the measures of happiness and economic growth, 
such as due to variation in data sources and data massage. This will have attenuated the 
change coefficients. Another reason is that our perspective on the real effect of economic 
growth is still blurred by external shocks such as the regime changes in the East European 
nations after the fall of communism and the civil wars in Africa. 
Seen in this perspective, the rise of happiness is comparable to the extension of 
longevity in modern society, where a long process of piecemeal increments has resulted in 
a doubling of our life time. 
In the long-term perspective, it is also clear that the rise of happiness is unlikely to 
continue forever, since an average happiness of about 8.5 is probably the maximum 
possible in a country. So there will be a point where economic growth no longer adds to 
greater happiness. Yet, economic development is also likely to contribute to longevity, 
which seems to be less bound to a maximum. If so, economic growth will still result in a 
rising number of happy life years for individuals (Veenhoven, 2005). 
 
5.3 New research questions 
The question raised by the Easterlin Paradox is why does economic growth not result in 
greater happiness. Now we have seen that economic growth typically does add to average 
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happiness in nations, the questions to ask are: how does economic growth add to happiness 
and why does it not always do so? To answer these questions we can build on 
the earlier research instigated by the Easterlin Paradox, such as on negative effects of 
economic growth and adaptation processes, but take these as elements in wider a balance 
of effects. 
In exploring how economic growth adds to happiness a crucial question is to determine 
to what extent the effect is due to increased consumption and to what extent it is due to 
institutional changes that tend to go together with economic development, such as political 
democracy and women’s emancipation. The recent study of Diener et al. (2012) suggests 
that a great deal of the effect of economic growth on happiness can be found in material 
comfort, but this is certainly not the last word. 
 
 
6        CONCLUSION 
 
Economic growth in nations does tend to go with rising happiness. Though there are cases 
where happiness remains stable in spite of economic growth, these are exceptions rather 
than the rule. The ‘Easterlin Paradox’ has become the ‘Easterlin Illusion’. 
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NOTES 
 
1 All this literature is listed in the Bibliography of Happiness, Section Fg02 ‘Happiness 
and economic growth/decline’ (Veenhoven, 2012a). 
2 The idea that average happiness in nations will not change over time also fits with the 
‘set-point’ theory of happiness, which became popular some 10 years later (e.g., 
Lykken, 1999). 
3 This collection includes only findings based on probability samples in the general 
population, typically aged 15 years or more. Studies among specific subgroups in a 
country are left out, such as people living in urban areas, working age people or 
internet users. 
4 We made an exception for the two variants of the question on life satisfaction used in 
the Latino Barometro, that is, the questions coded O-SLU-g-sq-v-4-b and O-SLu-g-sq-
v-4-c, which differ slightly in the wording of the answer options. In this case we could 
use the first data yielded by the happiness scale interval study (Veenhoven, 2009b) in 
which native speakers rated the degree of happiness denoted by the answer categories 
in intervals on scale  0 to 10. This enabled us to transform the observed frequency 
distributions to a mean on a common scale. 
5 An alternative to this bi-partition is to distinguish an additional intermediating category 
of small change. This requires an arbitrary definition of how small a small change 
should be and involves a loss of statistical power. Analyses of that kind showed the 
same pattern but did not reach statistical significance. 
6 In this context, Stevenson and Wolfers (2008, p. 18) rightly observe that “... absence of 
evidence should not be confused with evidence of absence”. 
7 The right top-case of rising happiness in spite of economic decline is not part of the 
Easterlin Paradox, but mentioned for the sake of completeness. 
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Scheme 1a 
Combinations of change in happiness and change in GDP per capita 
Rise or decline in GDP 
 
Change  happiness 
 
 
Change GDP  
 
growth 
 
decline 
 
increase 
 
concordant 
 
discordant 
 
decline 
 
discordant 
 
concordant 
 
 
Scheme 1b 
Combinations of change in happiness and change in GDP per capita 
Great or small rise in GDP  
 
Change  happiness 
 
 
Growth GDP  
 
great 
 
small 
 
increase 
 
concordant 
 
concordant 
 
decline 
 
discordant 
 
discordant 
 
Concordant =   in line with common sense, changes in happiness and GDP go together   
Discordant =   contrary to common sense, but in line with Easterlin’s thesis; no relation between change in 
happiness and GDP 
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Table 2a 
Change of average happiness in nations 
Frequency of rise versus decline 
 
Pattern of change 
 
 
 series 
 
nations 
 
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
 
Rise 
 
133 
 
67% 
 
41 
 
62% 
 
Decline 
 
66 
 
33% 
 
25 
 
38% 
 
Total 
 
199 
 
100% 
 
66 
 
100% 
 
Ratio rise-decline 
 
2.02 
 
1.63 
 
 
  
Ruut Veenhoven & Floris Vergunst 21 The Easterlin Illusion 
Table 2b 
Change of average happiness in nations 
Average yearly change in points on scale 0-10, split-up by length of period 
 
Period 
 
 series 
 
nations 
  
N 
 
b 
 
N 
 
b 
 
10- 20 years 
 
114 
 
+0.017 
 
30.5 
 
+0.010 
 
20-40 years 
 
67 
 
+0.013 
 
27.0 
 
+0.009 
 
> 40 years 
 
18 
 
+0.020 
 
8.5 
 
+0.030 
 
Total 
 
199 
 
+0.016 
 
67 
 
+0.012 
 
Table 3a 
Rise or decline of happiness and GDP 
Combinations of change coefficients observed in 1991 series 
 
Change  happiness 
 
 
 
Change GDP  
 
rise 
 
decline 
 
rise 
 
132 
 
1 
 
decline 
 
64 
 
2 
 
Concordant/discordant ratio 
 
2.1 
 
  
Table 3b 
Rise or decline of happiness by strong or modest economic growth 
Combinations observed in 1991
 
Change  happiness 
 
 series 
 
Growth GDP  
 
strong growth 
> median 
 
modest growth 
< median 
 
rise  
 
74 
 
59 
 
decline 
 
24 
 
41 
Odds Ratio =   2.14; 95% confidence interval +1.29 to +4.18  
 
 
1 Case of median economic growth not included 
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Table 3c 
Correlation between change in average happiness and growth GDP  
in 199 time series 
 
Time span 
 
Correlation coefficient 
Δ Happiness with Δ GDP 
 
95% confidence of r 
 
 
10-20 years 
 
+0.20 
 
+0.01 to +.037   
 
21-40 years 
 
+0.21 
 
+0.05 to +0.50 
 
> 40 years 
 
+0.20 
 
-0.03 to +0.61 
 
All periods 
 
+0.20 
 
+0.08 to +0.34 
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Table 4a 
Average effect of 1% growth GDP p.c. on average happiness on scale 0-10 
Split-up by time span 
 
Time span 
 
 
series 
 
N 
 
b 
 
10-20 years 
 
114 
 
0.0030 
 
21-40 years 
 
67 
 
0,0063 
 
> 40 years 
 
18 
 
0.0048 
 
All  
 
199 
 
0.0034 
  
Table 4b 
Average effect of 1% growth GDP p.c. on average happiness on scale 0-10 
Split-up by initial wealth of the nation 
 
Average income per 
capita in nation 
 
 
 series 
 
N 
 
b 
 
Low 
 
0 
 
- 
 
Lower middle 
 
20 
 
0.0117 
 
Upper middle 
 
56 
 
0.0034 
 
High 
 
123 
 
0.0029 
 
Total 
 
199 
 
0.0034 
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Table 4c 
Average effect of 1% growth GDP p.c. on average happiness on scale 0-10 
Split-up by instability of economic growth on a 0-1 scale 
 
Economic development 
 
 
 series 
 
N 
 
b 
 
Smooth: i < 0.1 
 
57 
 
0.0054 
 
Medium: 0.1 < i < 0.25 
 
80 
 
0.0032 
 
Bumpy: i > 0.25 
 
62 
 
0.0061 
 
Total 
 
199 
 
0.0034 
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Figure 1a 
Economic growth and rising happiness in nations 
Correlation in 114 series over 10 to 20 year periods 
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Figure 1b 
Economic growth and rising happiness in nations 
Correlation in 67 series over 21 to 40 year periods 
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Figure 1c 
Economic growth and rising happiness in nations 
Correlation in 18 series over periods of more than 40 years 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Example of a presentation of findings on average happiness in nations in the 
collection ‘Happiness in Nations’ of the ‘World Database of Happiness’ 
 
Distributional findings on happiness in Argentina (AR) 
 
 
Table A1  
Measure type: 111C four-step verbal happiness (see online version for colours) 
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Table A2  
Measure type: 121C four-step verbal life satisfaction (see online version for colours) 
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Table A3  
Measure type: 122F ten-step numeral life satisfaction (see online version for colours) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A4  
Measure type: 122G 11-step numeral life satisfaction (see online version for colours) 
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Table A5  
 
Measure type: 222 ten-item affect balance scale (Bradburn) (see online version  for 
colours) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A6  
Measure type: 235 more days like yesterday (see online version for colours) 
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Table A7  
Measure type: 236 14-item yesterday’s affect balance (see online version for colours) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A8  
Measure type: 31D 11-step numeral best-worst possible life (see online version 
for colours) 
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Table A9  
Measure type: 411B 3-step feel happy (see online version for colours) 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cite as: R. Veenhoven, Distributional findings on Happiness in 
Argentina (AR), World Database of Happiness, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The 
Netherlands [online] 
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl (accessed 2012-10-07) 
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Period Country OHL3 OHL4 OHL5 OSL2 OSL3 OSL4 OSL5 OSL7 OSL10 OSL11 CBW Happ/GDP GDP-growth Term Development Instability
2002–2011 Argentina           0.078 0.006 0.066 10–20 Upper mid. 0.491 
1981–2005 Argentina  0.026          0.003 0.055 21–40 Upper mid. 0.687 
1981–2006 Argentina         0.039   0.001 0.060 21–40 Upper mid. 0.733 
1975–2008 Australia           0.011 0 0.070 21–40 High 0.15 
1981–2005 Australia  –0.005          –0.001 0.054 21–40 High 0.178 
1981–2005 Australia          –0.001  –0.003 0.054 21–40 High 0.178 
1975–2011 Australia            0.001 0.072 21–40 High 0.185 
1995–2011 Austria      –0.027      –0.001 0.042 10–20 High 0.289 
1990–1999 Austria         0.187   0.018 0.049 10–20 High 0.314 
1990–2006 Austria  –0.029          –0.002 0.050 10–20 High 0.428 
1990–2000 Belarus  0.072          –0.559 –0.034 10–20 Upper mid. 0.243 
1990–2000 Belarus         –0.09   –0.317 –0.034 10–20 Upper mid. 0.243 
1981–1999 Belgium         0.011   0.001 0.050 10–20 High 0.133 
1989–2008 Belgium          –0.032  –0.002 0.059 10–20 High 0.27 
1975–1986 Belgium –0.054           –0.004 0.057 10–20 High 0.833 
1973–2011 Belgium      –0.008      0 0.077 21–40 High 0.098 
1981–2006 Belgium  0.016          0.002 0.052 21–40 High 0.154 
2002–2011 Bolivia           0.046 0.036 0.073 10–20 Lower mid. 0.116 
1997–2007 Bolivia      –0.05      0.055 0.031 10–20 Lower mid. 0.912 
1990–2006 Brazil  0.054          0.024 0.059 10–20 Upper mid. 0.92 
1990–2006 Brazil         0.022   0.001 0.059 10–20 Upper mid. 0.92 
1960–2011 Brazil           0.046 0.009 0.093 > 40 Upper mid. 0.249 
2001–2011 Bulgaria      0.05      0.009 0.139 10–20 Upper mid. 0.053 
2002–2011 Bulgaria           0.021 0.004 0.155 10–20 Upper mid. 0.055 
1990–2006 Bulgaria  0.029          –0.008 0.047 10–20 Upper mid. 0.734 
1990–2006 Bulgaria         0.019   0.014 0.047 10–20 Upper mid. 0.734 
1968–1977 Canada     –0.009       –0.001 0.112 10–20 High 0.053 
Notes: Missende data GDP: Egypte 1959, Croatia 1961–1989, Polen 1961–1984, USA 1945–1959, Finland 1955–1959, Estonia 1989–1994, Czech 1989, 
Lithuania 1989, Moldavia 1989, Serbia 1995–1996, Belarus 1989. 
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Period Country OHL3 OHL4 OHL5 OSL2 OSL3 OSL4 OSL5 OSL7 OSL10 OSL11 CBW Happ/GDP GDP-growth Term Development Instability
1981–2000 Canada  0.01          –0.002 0.042 10–20 High 0.174 
1982–2000 Canada         –0.004   0 0.038 10–20 High 0.203 
1997–2010 Chile      0.009      0.007 0.060 10–20 Upper mid. 0.334 
1990–2005 Chile  0.017          0.007 0.078 10–20 Upper mid. 0.383 
1990–2005 Chile         –0.025   –0.015 0.078 10–20 Upper mid. 0.383 
1990–2007 China  0.002          –0.002 0.120 10–20 Upper mid. 0.088 
1997–2011 China           –0.005 0.001 0.144 10–20 Upper mid. 0.16 
1990–2009 China         –0.019   –0.006 0.136 10–20 Upper mid. 0.198 
1990–2010 Costa Rica      –0.041      –0.016 0.057 21–40 Upper mid. 0.08 
1995–2007 Croatia         0.019   0.003 0.138 10–20 High 0.209 
1962–2011 Croatia           0.018 –0.011 0.070 > 40 High 0.19 
2001–2011 Cyprus      0.033      0.002 0.070 10–20 High 0.075 
2001–2011 Czech          0.026  0.002 0.115 10–20 High 0.075 
1990–2006 Czech  0.047          0.002 0.095 10–20 High 0.177 
1981–1999 Denmark         0.003   0 0.055 10–20 High 0.081 
1975–1986 Denmark –0.026           –0.006 0.064 10–20 High 0.51 
1972–2006 Denmark  0.019          0.002 0.085 21–40 High 0.072 
1973–2011 Denmark      0.014      0.001 0.078 21–40 High 0.084 
1962–2011 Dom. Republic           0.081 0.081 0.081 > 40 Upper mid. 0.177 
1997–2007 Ecuador      –0.05      –0.016 0.062 10–20 Upper mid. 0.483 
1960–2011 Egypt           –0.012 –0.107 0.064 > 40 Lower mid. 0.173 
1991–2010 El Salvador      –0.04      –0.03 0.073 10–20 Lower mid. 0.013 
1997–2006 England        –0.006    0 0.068 10–20 High 0.166 
1975–1986 England 0.023           0.004 0.088 10–20 High 0.305 
1973–2011 England      0.008      0.001 0.076 21–40 High 0.074 
1975–2011 England           0.002 0.001 0.073 21–40 High 0.074 
1981–2006 England  –0.002          0 0.069 21–40 High 0.075 
1981–2006 England         –0.003   0 0.069 21–40 High 0.075 
1990–1999 Estonia         –0.038   0.071 0.156 10–20 High 0.036 
Notes: Missende data GDP: Egypte 1959, Croatia 1961–1989, Polen 1961–1984, USA 1945–1959, Finland 1955–
1959, Estonia 1989–1994, Czech 1989, Lithuania 1989, Moldavia 1989, Serbia 1995–1996, Belarus 1989. 
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Period Country OHL3 OHL4 OHL5 OSL2 OSL3 OSL4 OSL5 OSL7 OSL10 OSL11 CBW Happ/GDP GDP-growth Term Development Instability
2001–2011 Estonia      0.091      0.006 0.128 10–20 High 0.153 
1990–2006 Estonia  0.051          0.008 0.151 10–20 High 0.162 
1956–2011 Finland      0.01      0.002 0.081 > 40 High 0.103 
1972–2006 Finland  0.01          0.001 0.089 21–40 High 0.104 
1981–2005 Finland         0   0 0.064 21–40 High 0.247 
1975–1986 France –0.003           0 0.064 10–20 High 0.546 
1973–2011 France      0.016      0.002 0.074 21–40 High 0.083 
1975–2011 France           0.032 0.003 0.064 21–40 High 0.092 
1981–2006 France  0.017          0.002 0.050 21–40 High 0.167 
1981–2006 France         0.011   0.001 0.050 21–40 High 0.167 
1991–2009 Germany 0.009           0.001 0.056 10–20 High 0.447 
1997–2006 Germany  0.001          0 0.013 10–20 High 0.814 
1990–2010 Germany      0.001      0.001 0.046 21–40 High 0.34 
1981–2011 Greece      –0.012      –0.002 0.057 21–40 High 0.151 
2002–2011 Guatemala           –0.15 –0.104 0.055 10–20 Lower mid. 0.044 
1997–2009 Guatemala      0.05      0.054 0.055 10–20 Lower mid. 0.238 
1997–2007 Honduras      0.005      0.004 0.077 10–20 Lower mid. 0.037 
2002–2011 Honduras           –0.12 –0.106 0.059 10–20 Lower mid. 0.042 
1981–1999 Hungary         –0.076   –0.048 0.054 10–20 High 0.074 
2001–2011 Hungary      –0.065      –0.007 0.104 10–20 High 0.138 
1981–2006 Hungary  –0.006          –0.002 0.076 21–40 High 0.234 
1981–1999 Iceland 0.004           0.001 0.056 10–20 High 0.192 
1981–1999 Iceland         –0.003   0 0.056 10–20 High 0.192 
1990–2006 India  0.027          0.072 0.050 10–20 Lower mid. 0.226 
1962–2011 India           0.044 0.087 0.067 > 40 Lower mid. 0.272 
1975–2007 India          0.064  0.315 0.056 21–40 Lower mid. 0.184 
1981–1999 Ireland         0.028   0.003 0.088 10–20 High 0.069 
1975–1986 Ireland 0.06           0.016 0.084 10–20 High 0.216 
Notes: Missende data GDP: Egypte 1959, Croatia 1961–1989, Polen 1961–1984, USA 1945–1959, Finland 1955–1959, Estonia 1989–1994, Czech 1989, 
Lithuania 1989, Moldavia 1989, Serbia 1995–1996, Belarus 1989. 
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Period Country OHL3 OHL4 OHL5 OSL2 OSL3 OSL4 OSL5 OSL7 OSL10 OSL11 CBW Happ/GDP GDP-growth Term Development Instability
1981–2006 Ireland  –0.006          0 0.094 21–40 High 0.13 
1973–2011 Ireland      0.002      0 0.095 21–40 High 0.153 
1961–2011 Israel           0.04 0.008 0.069 > 40 High 0.085 
1975–1986 Italy 0.053           0.011 0.084 10–20 High 0.188 
1973–2011 Italy      0.019      0.002 0.079 21–40 High 0.071 
1975–2011 Italy           0.027 0.003 0.073 21–40 High 0.075 
1975–2009 Italy          0.011  0.001 0.081 21–40 High 0.088 
1981–2006 Italy  0.024          0.003 0.067 21–40 High 0.156 
1981–2005 Italy         0.008   0.001 0.069 21–40 High 0.175 
1988–2005 Japan       –0.01     –0.001 0.049 10–20 High 0.623 
1964–2011 Japan      0.007      0.001 0.098 > 40 High 0.099 
1962–2011 Japan           0.023 0.002 0.100 > 40 High 0.099 
1978–2002 Japan       –0.021     –0.001 0.086 21–40 High 0.136 
1975–2007 Japan          0.022  0.002 0.075 21–40 High 0.159 
1981–2005 Japan  0.026          0.002 0.065 21–40 High 0.241 
1981–2005 Japan         0.013   0.001 0.065 21–40 High 0.241 
1981–2011 Korea           0.072 0.009 0.092 21–40 High 0.08 
1981–2005 Korea  0.081          0.014 0.099 21–40 High 0.093 
1981–2005 Korea         0.035   0.006 0.099 21–40 High 0.093 
1980–2007 Korea          0.028  0.004 0.108 21–40 High 0.096 
1981–2001 Korea        0.017    0.003 0.103 21–40 High 0.13 
2001–2011 Latvia      0.018      0.001 0.134 10–20 Upper mid. 0.193 
1990–2006 Latvia  0.049          0.011 0.068 10–20 Upper mid. 0.383 
1990–1999 Latvia         –0.068   0.1 0.015 10–20 Upper mid. 0.975 
2001–2011 Lithuania      0.04      0.004 0.132 10–20 Upper mid. 0.135 
1990–2006 Lithuania  0.065          0.011 0.076 10–20 Upper mid. 0.338 
1990–1999 Lithuania         –0.03   0.113 0.022 10–20 Upper mid. 0.968 
1975–1986 Luxembourg 0.038           0.008 0.050 10–20 High 0.707 
1975–2004 Luxembourg          0.009  0.001 0.082 21–40 High 0.092 
Notes: Missende data GDP: Egypte 1959, Croatia 1961–1989, Polen 1961–1984, USA 1945–1959, Finland 1955–
1959, Estonia 1989–1994, Czech 1989, Lithuania 1989, Moldavia 1989, Serbia 1995–1996, Belarus 1989. 
Table B1      Datamatrix (continued)  
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Period Country OHL3 OHL4 OHL5 OSL2 OSL3 OSL4 OSL5 OSL7 OSL10 OSL11 CBW Happ/GDP GDP-growth Term Development Instability
1973–2011 Luxembourg      0.009      0 0.092 21–40 High 0.145 
2001–2011 Malta      –0.011      –0.001 0.063 10–20 High 0.062 
1975–2011 Mexico           0.017 0.009 0.077 21–40 Upper mid. 0.146 
1975–2007 Mexico          0.23  0.01 0.084 21–40 Upper mid. 0.176 
1981–2005 Mexico  0.045          0.032 0.070 21–40 Upper mid. 0.248 
1981–2005 Mexico         0.017   0.016 0.070 21–40 Upper mid. 0.248 
1996–2006 Moldavia  0.023          –0.008 0.069 10–20 Lower mid. 0.649 
1996–2006 Moldavia         0.189   0.25 0.069 10–20 Lower mid. 0.649 
1975–1986 Netherlands 0.015           0.008 0.059 10–20 High 0.712 
1973–2011 Netherlands      0.007      0.001 0.078 21–40 High 0.103 
1977–2011 Netherlands   –0.005         0 0.062 21–40 High 0.113 
1981–2008 Netherlands  0.022          0.002 0.057 21–40 High 0.114 
1981–2008 Netherlands         0.001   0 0.057 21–40 High 0.114 
1974–2009 Netherlands       0.012     0.001 0.082 21–40 High 0.121 
1997–2007 Nicaragua      –0.076      –0.207 0.030 10–20 Lower mid. 0.149 
1990–2000 Nigeria  0.16          1.198 0.029 10–20 Lower mid. 0.953 
1990–2000 Nigeria         0.026   0.438 0.029 10–20 Lower mid. 0.953 
1962–2011 Nigeria           0.01 0.012 0.076 > 40 Lower mid. 0.597 
1981–1996 Norway         –0.019   –0.001 0.067 10–20 High 0.095 
1972–2007 Norway  –0.018          –0.001 0.094 21–40 High 0.109 
1962–2011 Panama           0.042 0.032 0.064 > 40 Upper mid. 0.112 
1997–2007 Paraguay      –0.055      –0.082 0.002 10–20 Lower mid. 0.672 
2002–2011 Peru           –0.009 0 0.101 10–20 Upper mid. 0.045 
1997–2007 Peru      –0.013      –0.007 0.038 10–20 Upper mid. 0.589 
1996–2005 Peru  0.015          0.002 0.032 10–20 Upper mid. 0.995 
1991–2000 Poland 0.028           0.01 0.082 10–20 High 0.05 
1990–2007 Poland  –0.011          –0.005 0.099 10–20 High 0.096 
1990–2007 Poland         0.028   0.08 0.099 10–20 High 0.096 
2001–2011 Poland      0.066      0.031 0.106 10–20 High 0.108 
Notes: Missende data GDP: Egypte 1959, Croatia 1961–1989, Polen 1961–1984, USA 1945–1959, Finland 1955–
1959, Estonia 1989–1994, Czech 1989, Lithuania 1989, Moldavia 1989, Serbia 1995–1996, Belarus 1989. 
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Period Country OHL3 OHL4 OHL5 OSL2 OSL3 OSL4 OSL5 OSL7 OSL10 OSL11 CBW Happ/GDP GDP-growth Term Development Instability
1962–2011 Poland           0.027 0.007 0.086 > 40 High 0.173 
1990–1999 Portugal         –0.011   –0.002 0.088 10–20 High 0.166 
1990–2006 Portugal  0.036          0.005 0.078 10–20 High 0.169 
1985–2011 Portugal      –0.02      –0.002 0.086 21–40 High 0.062 
1990–2006 Romania  –0.003          0.009 0.070 10–20 Upper mid. 0.467 
1990–2005 Romania         –0.015   0.031 0.055 10–20 Upper mid. 0.5 
1990–2003 Romania       –0.018     –0.003 0.021 10–20 Upper mid. 0.692 
2002–2011 Russia           0.09 0.01 0.210 10–20 Upper mid. 0.115 
1990–2005 Russia  0.046          0.037 0.031 10–20 Upper mid. 0.892 
1990–2005 Russia         0.056   0.073 0.031 10–20 Upper mid. 0.892 
1992–2005 Russia       0.128     –0.001 0.032 10–20 Upper mid. 0.981 
1996–2006 Serbia      –0.034      –0.018 0.123 10–20 Upper mid. 0.834 
1996–2006 Serbia      0.047      0.017 0.123 10–20 Upper mid. 0.834 
1990–1999 Slovakia         –0.015   –0.004 0.113 10–20 High 0.04 
2001–2011 Slovakia      0.116      0.008 0.108 10–20 High 0.074 
2002–2011 Slovakia           0.061 0.005 0.123 10–20 High 0.09 
1990–2006 Slovakia  0.07          0.011 0.115 10–20 High 0.129 
2001–2011 Slovenia      –0.01      0 0.073 10–20 High 0.104 
1990–2007 Slovenia         0.067   0.006 0.062 10–20 High 0.197 
1992–2006 Slovenia  0.111          0.013 0.061 10–20 High 0.228 
1962–2011 Slovenia           0.014 0.003 0.060 > 40 High 0.154 
2002–2011 South-Africa           –0.038 –0.006 0.106 10–20 Upper mid. 0.114 
1983–2002 South-Africa   –0.044         0.059 –0.001 10–20 Upper mid. 0.85 
1981–2007 South-Africa  0.03          0.015 0.048 21–40 Upper mid. 0.655 
1981–2007 South-Africa         0.015   0.041 0.048 21–40 Upper mid. 0.655 
1983–2004 South-Africa       –0.075     0 0.018 21–40 Upper mid. 0.924 
1985–2011 Spain      0.007      0 0.081 21–40 High 0.135 
1981–2007 Spain  0.015          0.002 0.069 21–40 High 0.137 
1981–2007 Spain         0.023   0.003 0.069 21–40 High 0.137 
Notes: Missende data GDP: Egypte 1959, Croatia 1961–1989, Polen 1961–1984, USA 1945–1959, Finland 1955–
1959, Estonia 1989–1994, Czech 1989, Lithuania 1989, Moldavia 1989, Serbia 1995–1996, Belarus 1989. 
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